Nastja Tomat<\/p>\n
Abstract
Epistemic rationality is a type of rationality directed towards
cognitive or epistemic goals, such as true beliefs, knowledge, or
understanding. Epistemology is primarily concerned with
normative questions about how one should form and update
beliefs, reason and inquire to be rational; on the other hand,
empirical disciplines, such as psychology, investigate how
inquiries and belief formation occur in real life. The question
arises as to what the relationship between the normative and the
descriptive in the study of epistemic rationality should be. This
paper proposes a notion of bounded epistemic rationality as a
hybrid, non-ideal concept that encompasses both normative and
descriptive elements. Drawing upon Herbert Simon\u2019s bounded
rationality and Robin McKenna\u2019s non-ideal epistemology,
bounded epistemic rationality is characterized by requiring
satisficing instead of maximizing; acknowledging our cognitive,
environmental, and practical limitations; its ecological nature;
and its focus on the process of inquiry. As such, bounded
epistemic rationality is a good starting point for proposing
epistemic advice that is achievable for real cognizers and helps
them improve their epistemic position.<\/p>\n
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